University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

2012

Class Certification as a Prerequisite for Cafa
Jurisdiction
Kevin Lampone

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Lampone, Kevin, "Class Certification as a Prerequisite for Cafa Jurisdiction" (2012). Minnesota Law Review. 405.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/405

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Note
Class Certification as a Prerequisite for CAFA
Jurisdiction
Kevin Lampone
After a federal court denies class certification, effectively
declaring that the case before it is not a class action, should the
case remain in federal court when the only basis for jurisdiction
is its status as a class action? Despite Congress intending the
1
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) to allow “the exercise of federal diversity jurisdiction over class actions with in2
terstate ramifications,” recent federal appellate decisions hold
that CAFA provides federal jurisdiction even over cases that a
3
court determines do not meet class action requirements. As a
result, a single plaintiff’s claim, potentially worth less than the
filing fee of the case itself, may remain in federal court under
4
CAFA.
Beyond that unintended result, there are many reasons
federal courts should not find that CAFA jurisdiction remains
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1. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
2. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 35 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 34.
3. Buetow v. A.L.S. Enters., Inc., 650 F.3d 1178, 1182 n.2 (8th Cir. 2011);
Metz v. Unizan Bank, 649 F.3d 492, 500–01 (6th Cir. 2011); United Steel
Workers Int’l Union v. Shell Oil Co., 602 F.3d 1087, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2010);
Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc., 592 F.3d 805, 807 (7th Cir. 2010);
Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1268 n.12 (11th Cir. 2009).
4. See, e.g., Ronat v. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc., Civil No.
05-520-GPM, 2008 WL 4963214, at *7 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2008) (involving a putative class with individual claims worth less than $120 each).
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5

after denying class certification. Some of those reasons are
6
7
broad and abstract: federalism, separation of powers, and
8
comity are just a few. Others are more practical, such as reduc9
ing the caseload of federal district courts.
For actual litigants, though, the more important reason is
that when a federal court retains jurisdiction in these circum10
stances, it “sounds [a] death knell” for the plaintiffs. Without
the potential for class-wide recovery, the individual representative plaintiff(s) in a putative class action remain in federal
court without the resources to make continued litigation feasi11
ble. If federal courts do not retain jurisdiction, however, cases
initiated in state court and removed to federal court through
CAFA are remanded to state court, thereby retaining the potential for a favorable outcome for the representative plain12
tiff(s) and the putative class.
5. But see G. Shaun Richardson, Class Dismissed, Now What?: Exploring
the Exercise of CAFA Jurisdiction After the Denial of Class Certification, 39
N.M. L. REV. 121, 144 –45 (2009) (detailing support for federal courts retaining
jurisdiction).
6. See Heather Scribner, Protecting Federalism Interests After the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1417 passim (2005) (arguing
that CAFA solved a horizontal federalism problem, but created a vertical one).
7. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 101 (1998)
(“The statutory and (especially) constitutional elements of jurisdiction are an
essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of powers, restraining the
courts from acting at certain times, and even restraining them from acting
permanently regarding certain subjects.” (citing Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974))); cf. Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie,
61 STAN. L. REV. 971, 1025 (2009) (arguing that fidelity to jurisdictional limits
and principles maintains an appropriate balance between Congress and the
federal courts).
8. Cf. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)
(holding that for supplemental jurisdiction, “[n]eedless decisions of state law
should be avoided . . . as a matter of comity”), superseded by statute, Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006).
9. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1189 (2010) (noting belief
among judges that federal dockets contained too many diversity jurisdiction
cases).
10. Cf. Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir.
1999) (concluding that “the denial of class status sounds the death knell of the
litigation” for the representative plaintiff, even without implicating jurisdictional issues).
11. Id.
12. See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2376–77 (2011) (rejecting
the preclusive effect of denying class certification in federal court on the issue
of certification in state court, even where the language of the state certification rule replicates the language of the federal rule); J.R. Clearwater Inc. v.
Ashland Chem. Co., 93 F.3d 176, 180 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that “the wide
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Accordingly, a number of district courts correctly hold that
denial of class certification requires the end of subject-matter
13
jurisdiction through CAFA. But the lack of significant analy14
sis by those courts leaves their holdings susceptible to reversal and criticism, especially as a number of federal appellate
15
courts have begun to hold otherwise.
This Note presents the analysis necessary to conclude that
class certification must be a prerequisite for continued jurisdiction through CAFA. Part I begins with an overview of class actions and federal jurisdiction, then places the intersection of
class certification and CAFA jurisdiction within that context.
Part I concludes by detailing the holdings and analyses of
courts and scholars that have addressed this issue.
Part II analyzes the faulty assumptions that courts rely
upon to find that CAFA jurisdiction remains after denial of
class certification: (1) that Congress intended CAFA jurisdic16
tion to irrevocably attach at the moment of filing and (2) that
the principle that post-removal events cannot alter jurisdiction
17
applies to class certification. Part II tests those assumptions
and concludes that class certification differs from post-removal
events that do not alter jurisdiction, consistent with Congress’s
discretion inherent in the decision as to whether or not to certify a class dictates that each court—or at least each jurisdiction—be free to make its own
determination in this regard”).
13. E.g., McGaughey v. Treistman, No. 05 Civ. 7069(HB), 2007 WL 24935,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2007).
14. See, e.g., id. (“Because Plaintiff ’s motion for class certification must be
denied, Plaintiff ’s action is no longer a class action, and this Court cannot retain subject-matter jurisdiction in diversity over Plaintiff ’s action pursuant to
the Class Action Fairness Act.”).
15. See, e.g., Metz v. Unizan Bank, 649 F.3d 492, 500 (6th Cir. 2011)
(“Although district courts have relied upon other language in CAFA to determine that they do not retain jurisdiction following denial of class certification,
we agree with the [Seventh Circuit’s] contrary interpretation . . . .”); Mills v.
Foremost Ins. Co., No. 806-CV-00986-EAK-AEP, 2011 WL 440163, at *4 (M.D.
Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (citing three circuit courts of appeals as guiding the district
court’s decision to retain jurisdiction); Long v. Dick’s Sporting Goods, Inc., Civil Action No. 3:09CV-353-H, 2010 WL 2044524, at *2 (W.D. Ky. May 21, 2010)
(finding “the reasoning espoused by the Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
more persuasive” and dismissing “that a few district courts have taken the opposite position”).
16. E.g., Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc., 592 F.3d 805, 806
(7th Cir. 2010).
17. E.g., id. at 807 (“Our conclusion vindicates the general principle that
jurisdiction once properly invoked is not lost by developments after a suit is
filed.” (citing St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 293–
95 (1938); In re Shell Oil Co., 970 F.2d 355, 356 (7th Cir. 1992) ( per curiam))).
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intent to include class certification as a factor in determining
continued CAFA jurisdiction.
Part III explains why CAFA jurisdiction must end when a
court denies class certification. When federal courts deny certification to a putative class, CAFA requires that cases initially
filed in state court be remanded. This approach complies with
Congress’s grant of jurisdiction in CAFA, conforms to established precedent, and effectively balances the competing interests implicated by determinations of both jurisdiction and class
certification.
I. CAFA JURISDICTION AND THE ROLE OF CLASS
CERTIFICATION
This Part provides background for understanding the interaction between class certification and CAFA jurisdiction. To
begin, Part I presents an overview of the purposes and procedures of class actions, then outlines jurisdiction in federal
courts generally and specifically in the context of class actions.
Briefly, class actions allow multiple parties to jointly bring a
18
claim or defense, subject to certain limitations. In addition to
meeting class action requirements, a class action must also
meet jurisdictional requirements—to hear any case, all courts
must have jurisdiction both over the parties and over the con19
troversy at issue. For many class actions that otherwise could
not be heard in federal court, CAFA provides that jurisdiction.
With that background in place, Part I concludes by detailing
existing approaches to determining CAFA jurisdiction for putative class actions when a court denies certification, rejecting
the case’s sole basis for federal jurisdiction.
A. CLASS ACTIONS
A class action is a procedural device allowing a group too
numerous to effectively sue or be sued individually to do so col20
lectively. Class actions allow “those with small claims for
18. See infra Part I.A (discussing class actions).
19. See infra Part I.B (discussing federal jurisdiction). Jurisdiction, as
used in this Note, refers to subject-matter jurisdiction. CAFA does not implicate jurisdiction over the parties—personal jurisdiction—and this Note’s use of
the term “jurisdiction” similarly does not refer to personal jurisdiction.
20. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir. 1948).
While initially only equitable claims qualified for class action treatment, the
procedure now applies to all civil actions. Id. See generally 7A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1751 (3d ed. 2005) (detailing the history and purpose of class actions).
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whom individual litigation would be economically irrational to
band together in group litigation against a common adver21
22
sary” with one or more plaintiffs representing the class. In
addition to enabling plaintiffs to bring otherwise economically
infeasible claims, class actions are “peculiarly appropriate” for
issues and questions of law that apply to a class and “save[] the
resources of both the courts and the parties by permitting an
issue potentially affecting every [class member] to be litigated
23
in an economical fashion.”
To utilize this procedural device, litigants must fit their
putative class within a court’s procedural requirements for
class actions. In federal courts, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
24
Civil Procedure defines those requirements. Rule 23 includes
two sets of procedural hurdles putative class actions must clear
25
to proceed in federal court. First, putative class actions may
be filed in federal court only if they meet certain prerequi26
sites, commonly referred to as numerosity, commonality, typi27
cality, and adequacy requirements. Second, the putative class
28
must conform to one of three types of class actions based gen-

21. Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1487 (2008). Class
actions satisfy other goals as well. 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 1754
(describing the objectives of class actions as “the efficient resolution of the
claims or liabilities of many individuals in a single action, the elimination of
repetitious litigation and possibly inconsistent adjudications involving common questions, related events, or requests for similar relief, and the establishment of an effective procedure for those whose economic position is such
that it is unrealistic to expect them to seek to vindicate their rights in separate lawsuits”).
22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) (requiring representative plaintiffs to “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class”).
23. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982) (second alteration in original) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979)).
24. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct.
1431, 1438 (2010) (“[L]ike the rest of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 23 automatically applies ‘in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts . . . .’” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1 and citing Califano,
442 U.S. at 699–700)).
25. Id. at 1437.
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
27. See, e.g., Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437 (“The suit must satisfy the
criteria set forth in subdivision (a) (i.e., numerosity, commonality, typicality,
and adequacy of representation) . . . .”). For further background on these requirements, see generally 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, §§ 1759–71.
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 23( b).
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erally on the relief sought and the individual and collective ef29
fect on putative class members.
30
Before the case may truly qualify as a class action, the
court must certify that the class meets those procedural re31
quirements. Class certification, which must occur “at an early
32
33
practicable time,” requires federal courts to define the class
and perform a rigorous analysis to ensure the class, as defined,
34
conforms to the requirements. That rigorous analysis does not
allow for assumptions about the validity of the facts satisfying
35
class certification requirements.
Rule 23, as described above, provides the structure and
procedure for class actions in federal court. Most states have
36
similar, if not identical, rules for their courts; however, state
rules—even those with language identical to the federal rule—
often apply more broadly, allowing more putative classes to fit
37
within their requirements than federal courts allow. Regardless of forum, before a putative class may begin making its case
for class treatment it must first establish that the court has ju38
risdiction to hear the case.

29. 20 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 77. See generally 7AA WRIGHT ET
note 20, §§ 1772–84.1.
30. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1438 (stating that both “eligibility and
certifiability . . . . are preconditions” for class treatment under the federal rule
and rejecting the argument that the two are distinct issues); Richard L. Marcus, Assessing CAFA’s Stated Jurisdictional Policy, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1765,
1778 (2008) (describing class actions as “constructs approved (indeed, created)
by the court’s certification order”).
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1).
32. Id. at 23(c)(1)(A).
33. Id. at 23(c)(1)( B).
34. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 318 (3d Cir.
2008); see also Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982).
35. In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 320; see also Falcon, 457 U.S. at
160 (“[A]ctual, not presumed, conformance with Rule 23(a) remains, however,
indispensable.”).
36. Compare, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–( b) ( providing the federal rules for
class actions), with W. VA. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–( b) ( providing West Virginia’s rules
for class actions).
37. See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2377–78 (2011) (comparing
West Virginia’s rule to its federal counterpart); Allan Kanner, Interpreting the
Class Action Fairness Act in a Truly Fair Manner, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1654
(2006) (noting plaintiffs’ greater difficulty achieving certification in federal
courts than in state courts); Marcus, supra note 30, at 1797.
38. 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 1755.
AL., supra
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B. FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction, as used in this Note, refers to the power of a
court to hear a case. This form of jurisdiction—subject-matter
jurisdiction—presumptively exists for cases filed in state
39
courts. Federal courts, however, are courts of limited jurisdic40
tion and may only hear specifically defined types of cases.
Both the Constitution and Congress provide the limits on
41
federal courts’ jurisdiction. The Constitution defines the ulti42
mate bounds of that jurisdiction, acting as a broad federalism43
based check protecting individual states. Those bounds are
44
further limited by Congress’s power over federal jurisdiction.
45
As a separation-of-powers-based check on the judicial branch,
the Constitution authorizes Congress to regulate federal juris46
diction. In practice, Congress must authorize and define con-

39. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS § 7, at 27 (6th ed. 2002); id. § 45, at 289; Bloom, supra note 7, at 987 &
n.96.
40. See, e.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374
(1978) (“It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction.”), superseded by statute, Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, 28
U.S.C. § 1367; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173–80 (1803)
(holding that federal courts may not exercise jurisdiction beyond the limits set
by both the Constitution and Congress).
41. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999); Bender v.
Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986); Marbury, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) at 173–80.
42. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Bloom,
supra note 7, at 987; see also Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 174.
43. Letter from James Madison to Edward Everett (Aug. 28, 1830), in 9
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 383, 395–98 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
44. Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 583; see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 506, 512–13 (1868) (“[J ]urisdiction . . . is not derived from acts of Congress. It is, strictly speaking, conferred by the Constitution. But it is conferred
‘with such exceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall make.’”
(citation omitted)); Michael Wells, Why Professor Redish Is Wrong About Abstention, 19 GA. L. REV. 1097, 1125–27 (1985) (explaining that Congress’s
power to limit the jurisdiction of lower federal courts is derived from the Constitution).
45. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 101 (1998).
46. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XI (defining the scope of federal jurisdiction and granting Congress the power to establish federal courts below the Supreme Court and to make exceptions and
regulations for the exercise of federal jurisdiction); Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 583;
Bloom, supra note 7, at 987; see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at
512–13.
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stitutionally permissible jurisdiction before federal courts may
47
exercise it.
C. CAFA: FEDERAL JURISDICTION FOR CLASS ACTIONS
While some class actions come within federal jurisdiction
through the generally applicable grants of federal jurisdiction
over cases involving federal laws (federal-question jurisdiction)
48
or citizens of different states (diversity jurisdiction), class ac49
tions often do not fit within those grants. For many class ac50
tions, CAFA provides jurisdiction to federal courts.
Congress enacted CAFA in response to “the numerous
51
problems with our current class action system.” Because state
court procedural rules often allow for certification of more class
actions, Congress used CAFA to expand federal jurisdiction to
47. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986).
The opposite approach—that federal courts may always exercise jurisdiction
over a case permitted by the Constitution unless Congress creates an exception—appears just as sensible, but was rejected by the judiciary. See Ex parte
McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 513 (explaining that Congress’s affirmative
grant of jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789, derived from Congress’s
power to make exceptions and regulations to federal jurisdiction, implicates
the negation of any jurisdiction not congressionally authorized (citing
Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 314 (1810))).
48. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XI; 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (federal question); id. § 1332 (diversity).
49. See Michael D.Y. Sukenik & Adam J. Levitt, CAFA and Federalized
Ambiguity: The Case for Discretion in the Unpredictable Class Action, 120
YALE L.J. ONLINE 233, 235 & n.5 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/
pdfs/945.pdf (describing barriers to federal jurisdiction over class actions prior
to CAFA’s enactment); cf. Burbank, supra note 21, at 1495 (noting that in the
context of torts, only state law frequently applies, eliminating federal-question
jurisdiction).
50. Class actions may have independent bases for subject-matter jurisdiction, but in those cases class certification will not affect the basis for jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 606 F.3d 379, 380 (7th
Cir. 2010) (noting that CAFA jurisdiction was only implicated after standard
diversity jurisdiction was defeated); Burbank, supra note 21, at 1450 (noting
that CAFA only applies to class actions featuring classes of more than 100
persons and more than $5 million in controversy). Class actions with fewer
than 100 persons are certifiable under Rule 23, but do not qualify for CAFA
jurisdiction. See Phila. Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452,
463 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (allowing a class of twenty-five plaintiffs under Rule 23).
This Note examines the sections of CAFA that comprise “the heart” of the
statute, but CAFA also provides a Consumer Bill of Rights and jurisdiction for
mass actions—certain types of cases with over 100 plaintiffs—that would not
otherwise meet class action requirements. GEORGENE M. VAIRO, CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005: WITH COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS 9–22, 32–38
(2005).
51. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 4 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 5.
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52

include most interstate class actions. Simply put, Congress
sought to utilize federal class action procedures to effect substantive change in class action litigation; more accurately, Congress expanded federal jurisdiction to allow federal class action
53
procedures to effect those substantive changes.
CAFA effects these changes through an expansion of diver54
sity jurisdiction. While the Constitution allows for federal ju55
risdiction so long as minimal diversity exists, the generally
applicable diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, requires com56
plete diversity. CAFA enables federal jurisdiction for class ac57
tions with only minimal diversity, so long as more than $5
million is in controversy and the class contains at least 100
58
members. CAFA applies the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s
definition of a class action to define cases for which CAFA may
59
provide jurisdiction, but does not make clear if that definition

52. Id. at 4 –5, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5–7.
53. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 30, at 1788–89 ( “ [CAFA] was justified on
the basis of essentially two jurisdictional policies: it provided that federal class
action procedures would be available for handling many state law class action
cases, and it ensured a federal forum for cases of national significance.”); David Marcus, Erie, the Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1310–11 (2007)
[hereinafter Marcus, Erie, CAFA, and Federalism] (noting that “CAFA simply
expands diversity jurisdiction,” but suggesting that “Congress cloak[ed] its
substantive goal of limiting liability for state law causes of action in a procedural guise”).
54. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6.
55. Rather than requiring that all plaintiffs’ citizenship differ from all defendants’, as with complete diversity, only one plaintiff ’s and one defendant’s
citizenship must differ. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, amended by U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006) ( limiting diversity jurisdiction to actions
between “citizens of different States”); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 267, 267 (1806) (requiring complete diversity under the statute); see
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967) (clarifying
that Strawbridge’s complete diversity requirement derived from the statute,
not the Constitution, and reaffirming that the Constitution requires only minimal diversity). See generally WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 39, § 24, 158–60
(describing implications and evolution of complete and minimal diversity).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) ( limiting federal jurisdiction to class actions in
which “any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a state different from
any defendant”).
58. Id. (amount in controversy); id. § 1332(d)(5)( B) (numerosity).
59. Id. §§ 1332(d)(1)( B), 1711(2); see also infra notes 130–36 and accompanying text (arguing that CAFA’s use of the Rule 23 definition of class action
weighs against determining jurisdiction only at the time of filing suit). Rule 23
sets out the factors courts use to make certification decisions, thereby defining
class actions.
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should include cases filed as class actions but denied class certi60
fication.
For cases meeting its requirements, CAFA allows for jurisdiction both when the case is initiated in federal court and in
most cases when the defendant seeks to remove cases initiated
61
in state court. Regardless of which method brings a putative
class action to federal court, the court must approve or reject
62
certification. When courts deny certification, CAFA does not
provide a clear answer to the question raised by the following
cases: what happens to jurisdiction premised on a case’s classification as a class action after the court rejects that
63
classification?
D. CLASS CERTIFICATION’S ROLE IN CAFA JURISDICTION
Generally, federal courts have reached one of three conclusions about what effect the denial of class certification has on
64
CAFA jurisdiction : (1) that CAFA jurisdiction must end with
65
the denial of certification, (2) that CAFA jurisdiction remains,
66
but the court should not exercise that jurisdiction, or (3) that
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8); Metz v. Unizan Bank, 649 F.3d 492, 500
(6th Cir. 2011) (“CAFA does not specifically address whether a district court
may retain jurisdiction following the denial of class certification.”).
61. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453( b). For background on removal, see generally
Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 61–66
(2008) (types of jurisdictional provisions in removal statutes); Steven Plitt &
Joshua D. Rogers, Charting a Course for Federal Removal Through the Abstention Doctrine, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 107, 109–13 (2006) (explaining removal).
62. See, e.g., Clausnitzer v. Fed. Express Corp., 621 F. Supp. 2d 1266,
1268–69 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (examining certification decisions both in cases initially filed in federal court and in cases removed to federal court). Remand implicates additional considerations, such as forum-shopping and appellate consequences, however. See Allen-Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 07cv-4087, 2009 WL 1285522, at *2 n.6 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 2009).
63. Metz, 649 F.3d at 500; United Steel Workers Int’l Union v. Shell Oil
Co., 602 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Even though CAFA indisputably
creates original federal jurisdiction prior to class certification, the statute does
not say whether the post-removal denial of class certification divests the federal courts of jurisdiction . . . .”).
64. See Allen-Wright, 2009 WL 1285522, at *1 n.5 (contrasting outcomes
in eighteen cases that ruled on the issue).
65. See, e.g., Salazar v. Avis Budget Grp., Inc., No. 07-cv-0064 -IEG
(WMC), 2008 WL 5054108, at *5–6 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2008); Clausnitzer, 621
F. Supp. 2d at 1269–70; McGaughey v. Treistman, No. 05 Civ. 7069(HB), 2007
WL 24935, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2007).
66. See, e.g., Giannini v. Schering-Plough Corp., No. C-06-06823-SBA,
2007 WL 1839789, at *2–4 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2007) (applying supplementaljurisdiction standards to decline exercise of jurisdiction); see also Richardson,
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CAFA jurisdiction remains and the court should continue to ex67
ercise it. The following Section examines the reasoning supporting each of these conclusions.
1. Courts Denying Class Certification Do Not Retain
Jurisdiction Through CAFA
A number of federal district courts across the country hold
that denial of class certification ousts jurisdiction through
68
CAFA. Those courts have at times qualified their holdings, for
example deciding that jurisdiction is ousted only if “it is clear
there is no foreseeable possibility that the plaintiff may obtain
69
certification in the future.” Courts that have made unqualified
holdings have provided little support for their findings, as in
McGaughey v. Treistman: “Because Plaintiff’s motion for class
certification must be denied, Plaintiff’s action is no longer a
class action, and this Court cannot retain subject-matter jurisdiction in diversity over Plaintiff’s action pursuant to the Class
70
Action Fairness Act.” In contrast, courts holding that jurisdiction remains provide more support and analysis, whether they
exercise it or not.
2. Courts Denying Class Certification Retain Jurisdiction
Through CAFA, but Should Not Exercise It
Some courts have determined, and scholars have argued,
that federal courts retain jurisdiction after denial of class certification, but that jurisdiction should not be exercised based on
71
discretionary standards of either supplemental jurisdiction or
72
the abstention doctrine. For example, in Giannini v. ScheringPlough Corp., the Northern District of California held that jurisdiction for CAFA is only measured at the time of filing and
73
therefore determined it retained jurisdiction. The court went
on, however, to reason that the original claim supporting juris74
diction was dismissed when the class certification was denied
supra note 5, at 141–47 (arguing for use of abstention to decline exercise of
jurisdiction).
67. See, e.g., Metz, 649 F.3d at 500–01.
68. E.g., Salazar, 2008 WL 5054108, at *5–6; Clausnitzer, 621 F. Supp. 2d
at 1269–70; McGaughey, 2007 WL 24935, at *3.
69. Clausnitzer, 621 F. Supp. 2d at 1270.
70. McGaughey, 2007 WL 24935, at *3.
71. See, e.g., Giannini, 2007 WL 1839789, at *2–4.
72. Richardson, supra note 5, at 141–47.
73. Giannini, 2007 WL 1839789, at *2.
74. See id. at *3.
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and analyzed the claim anew in the context of supplemental ju75
risdiction. Concluding that the elements of supplemental jurisdiction analysis—judicial economy, convenience and fairness, and comity—were best served by remand to state court,
76
the court declined to exercise its jurisdiction.
Another approach is that after denial of class certification,
courts retain CAFA jurisdiction, but should decline to exercise
77
it through the abstention doctrine. The abstention doctrine
balances the interests of federal courts hearing a case “against
78
countervailing concerns, such as comity and federalism.” In
the context of CAFA jurisdiction after a court denies class certification, application of the abstention doctrine acknowledges
the minimal interest federal courts have in retaining cases that
79
no longer meet class action requirements. Implicit in this application of abstention is that federal courts always retain jurisdiction after denying class certification.
Though both of these approaches properly conclude that
CAFA jurisdiction should not be exercised after a court denies
class certification, they only reach that conclusion after finding
that certification has no effect on CAFA jurisdiction. In so finding, both approaches rely on the same reasoning as courts fol80
lowing the approach examined in the following subsection.
3. Courts Denying Class Certification Retain Jurisdiction
Through CAFA, and Should Exercise It
Other courts hold that they retain jurisdiction through
81
CAFA despite denying class certification. These courts tend to
rely on two assumptions. One assumption focuses on use of the
82
word “filed” in CAFA’s definition of a class action. The other
assumption relies on the general principle that once a court acquires subject-matter jurisdiction, later events do not eliminate

75. Id. at *3–4. Supplemental jurisdiction grants courts jurisdiction over
claims that would not independently establish jurisdiction by latching onto
other related claims that do establish jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006).
76. Giannini, 2007 WL 1839789, at *4.
77. See Richardson, supra note 5, at 141–47.
78. Id. at 141.
79. See id.
80. See id. at 128–29.
81. Allen-Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 07-cv-4087, 2009
WL 1285522, at *1 n.5 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 2009) (citing eight such cases).
82. E.g., Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc., 592 F.3d 805, 806
(7th Cir. 2010); Allen-Wright, 2009 WL 1285522, at *3.
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83

that jurisdiction. Both of those assumptions are explained in
84
Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc. In that case, the
Seventh Circuit overturned a federal district court’s remand to
state court after the district court had denied class
85
certification.
To come to that decision, the Seventh Circuit first looked to
86
CAFA’s definition of a class action. CAFA defines a class action as “any civil action filed under rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial
procedure authorizing an action to be brought by 1 or more rep87
resentative persons as a class action.” Though the court recognized some ambiguity in that definition’s interaction with
other parts of CAFA, it relied on the definition’s use of the word
filed to determine that jurisdiction attaches when the suit is
88
commenced.
After finding that CAFA jurisdiction attached upon commencement of a suit, the court further held that this jurisdic89
tion cannot be ousted by later developments. Calling this holding a “general principle,” the court cited St. Paul Mercury
90
Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co. In St. Paul Mercury, the plaintiff filed a complaint in state court that alleged damages sufficient to meet the minimum amount in controversy requirement
91
for federal jurisdiction. After the defendant removed the case
to federal court, the plaintiff amended the complaint to lower
92
the alleged damages below the jurisdictional threshold. On
review, the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction remained,
however, analogizing the issue to when a party changes place of
citizenship after a complaint is filed to destroy diversity juris83. E.g., Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 807; Allen-Wright, 2009 WL 1285522,
at *3–4.
84. Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 806–07. While other courts of appeals and
district courts have addressed the issue, Cunningham includes the relevant
analysis from those other similar cases. See cases cited supra note 3.
85. Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 804 –05.
86. Id. at 806; see also Metz v. Unizan Bank, 649 F.3d 492, 500 (6th Cir.
2011).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)( B) (2006) (emphasis added).
88. Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 806 (“But remember that jurisdiction attaches when a suit is filed as a class action, and that invariably precedes certification.”); see also Metz, 649 F.3d at 500.
89. Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 807; see also Metz, 649 F.3d at 500–01.
90. Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 807 (citing St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v.
Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 293–95 (1938)); see also Metz, 649 F.3d at 500–01.
91. St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. at 284.
92. Id. at 285.
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93

diction. In situations such as these, courts seek to prevent
parties from forum manipulation by holding that these actions
94
do not oust jurisdiction. Conversely, where jurisdiction is not
yet properly invoked, destroying the basis for jurisdiction and
95
making remand to state court proper. Though the Seventh
Circuit recognized exceptions to this principle, and their potential application to CAFA, it found the exceptions were not ap96
plicable in Cunningham.
Cunningham exemplifies the reasoning behind federal
courts retaining jurisdiction through CAFA after a federal
court denies class certification; but it is just one example. The
97
Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have similarly
concluded that jurisdiction through CAFA does not depend on
98
class certification. However, this line of reasoning is troubling
99
for the reasons detailed below, making further analysis exploring the two assumptions exemplified by Cunningham necessary. The following Part analyzes the reasoning of those federal courts that, like Cunningham, find jurisdiction remains
through CAFA despite denying class certification.
II. CAFA JURISDICTION DOES NOT IRREVOCABLY
ATTACH AT THE MOMENT OF FILING
Courts holding that CAFA jurisdiction remains despite
denying class certification tend to rely on two erroneous assumptions: (1) that CAFA jurisdiction fully attaches when the
case is filed as a class action, and (2) that once CAFA jurisdic-

93. Id. at 289–90, 294 –95.
94. See id. at 294 (finding that “the plaintiff ought not to be able to . . .
bring the cause back to the state court at his election,” subjecting the defendant’s right to removal to the plaintiff ’s caprice).
95. Cf. id. at 295 (when removing defendants are dismissed, leaving only
parties involuntarily in federal court, courts should remand to state court).
96. Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc., 592 F.3d 805, 807 (7th
Cir. 2010). Examples the Cunningham court suggests include mootness arising during litigation, amended pleadings eliminating jurisdiction, or when
there never really was jurisdiction to start with. Id.; see also Metz v. Unizan
Bank, 649 F.3d 492, 501 n.4 (6th Cir. 2011).
97. Buetow v. A.L.S. Enters., Inc., 650 F.3d 1178, 1182 n.2 (8th Cir. 2011);
Metz, 649 F.3d at 500–01; United Steel Workers Int’l Union v. Shell Oil Co.,
602 F.3d 1087, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2010); Vega v. T–Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d
1256, 1268 n.12 (11th Cir. 2009).
98. A number of district courts have come to similar conclusions. E.g., Allen-Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 07-cv-4087, 2009 WL 1285522,
at *3–4 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 2009).
99. See infra Part II.
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100

tion attaches at filing, it cannot be ousted by later events.
These courts, however, have recognized the potential flaws in
101
those assumptions. This Part examines those assumptions
and their flaws—both of which weigh against federal courts retaining jurisdiction through CAFA after denying class
certification.
A. CAFA DOES NOT REQUIRE COURTS TO DETERMINE
JURISDICTION SOLELY AT THE TIME OF FILING
To determine that jurisdiction should only be measured at
the time of filing, federal courts holding that jurisdiction remains despite denying class certification misapply CAFA’s def102
inition of a class action. Because CAFA’s definition of a class
103
action uses the phrase “filed under,” these federal courts conclude that upon the act of filing a complaint (as a class action)
104
CAFA jurisdiction irrevocably attaches. This conclusion erro105
neously relies on the word “filed” only meaning “to file,” ra106
ther than “on file,” instead.
That meaning, focused solely on the act of filing rather
than the continuing status of a case remaining on file, is incorrect for three reasons. First, Congress used the word “com100. See supra Part I.C.3.
101. See, e.g., Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 806 (noting that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(8) may imply CAFA jurisdiction is limited to cases where courts certify a class and that § 1332(d)(1)(C) may mean the lack of a certification order
puts a case outside the definition of a class action); Allen-Wright, 2009 WL
1285522, at *3 (noting that denial of class certification should be addressed
differently than changes in citizenship or amount in controversy); cf. United
Steel Workers, 602 F.3d at 1092 n.3 (recognizing exceptions to the rule of “once
jurisdiction, always jurisdiction,” including situations where there was “no jurisdiction to begin with because the jurisdictional allegations were frivolous
from the start”); Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 807 (same).
102. See supra Part I.C.3.
103. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(1)( B), 1711(2) (2006); see Coll. of Dental Surgeons of P.R. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 585 F.3d 33, 39–40 (1st Cir. 2009)
(“To satisfy CAFA’s definition of a class action, a case need only be ‘filed under’
either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 or some state-law analogue of that
rule.” (emphasis omitted)).
104. E.g., Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 806 (stating that jurisdiction attaches
when a suit is filed as a class action); see also Richardson, supra note 5, at 135,
139–40 (“Under CAFA’s plain language, CAFA jurisdiction attaches the moment a pleading featuring class allegations . . . is filed, and . . . an order denying class certification . . . cannot destroy that jurisdiction.”).
105. “To file” meaning the act of “submit[ting] documents necessary to initiate a legal proceeding.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 467
(11th ed. 2003).
106. “On file” meaning “in or as if in a file for ready reference.” Id.
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menced” in the statute to express that meaning and to narrowly focus on the moment of filing. Second, Congress’s other uses
of the word “filed” throughout CAFA, and other structural considerations, similarly demonstrate Congress understood the
phrase “filed under” to require continuing status as a class action. Last, CAFA’s reliance on Rule 23’s definition of a class action shows Congress did not intend for courts to measure jurisdiction solely at the instant of filing, but instead intended
CAFA’s jurisdiction only to apply to a case that remains a class
action filed under Rule 23. Each of these reasons is examined
below.
First, federal courts finding CAFA jurisdiction remains despite denying class certification mistakenly apply the meaning
107
108
of the word “commenced” to the phrase “filed under.” For
instance, in Cunningham, the Seventh Circuit stated: “[CAFA]
jurisdiction attaches when a suit is filed as a class action, and
109
that invariably precedes certification.” There, the Seventh
Circuit forces the word “filed” to mean initiated or begun, as it
focuses on a single point in time that must precede certifica110
tion. But when Congress intended to convey that same mean111
ing (initiated or begun), it used the word “commenced.” To
make clear that CAFA would only apply to cases initiated after
the statute’s enactment, Congress made clear the statute would
only apply to class actions “commenced on or after the date of
112
enactment” of CAFA.

107. “Commence” may be used as a transitive verb meaning “to enter upon:
BEGIN” or as an intransitive verb meaning “to have or make a beginning:
START.” Id. at 249.
108. “File” may be used as a transitive verb meaning “to place among official records as prescribed by law” or “to initiate (as a legal action) through
proper formal procedure.” Id. at 467. “File” may also be used as an intransitive
verb meaning “to submit documents necessary to initiate a legal proceeding.”
Id.
109. Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 806.
110. Id.
111. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4,
14 (codified in scattered sections 28 U.S.C.).
112. Id. (emphasis added) (“The amendments made by this Act shall apply
to any civil action commenced on or after the date of enactment of this Act.”).
What exactly the word “commenced” meant was itself a matter of great debate,
see, e.g., Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, The “Commencement” Problem: Lessons
from a Statute’s First Year, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 469, 474 –509 (2006) (examining issues raised in defining the word “commenced”), but it certainly more
precisely means what courts have attempted to define the phrase “filed under”
to mean here.
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Using both the word “commenced” and the word “filed”
shows Congress understood the two words to have different
113
If Congress intended its definition of cases to
meanings.
which CAFA’s jurisdictional grant applies to mean all cases initiated or begun under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro114
cedure (or a state-law analogue), “commenced” is the word
used later in the statute to mean exactly that. Because “certain
language in one part of the statute and different language in
another” creates an assumption that “different meanings were
115
intended,” CAFA’s use of the word “filed” instead of the word
“commenced” in the definition of a class action supports requir116
ing class certification for continued CAFA jurisdiction.
Second, in addition to the filed/commenced distinction,
numerous other examples in the structure of CAFA similarly
require the word “filed” to mean more than simply the moment
of filing. One example is the repeated use of the phrase “origi117
nally filed” in other sections of CAFA. While the word “filed”
is susceptible to the meaning federal courts have given it in or118
der to retain jurisdiction after denying class certification,
there is no need to modify it with “originally” if Congress intended it to mean, or believed it would be interpreted to mean,
113. The word “filed” is susceptible to the meaning courts like Cunningham
have imputed to it, see supra note 108 (noting that the definition of “file” includes initiating a legal action), but given that the word “commenced” more
precisely means the same thing, see supra note 107, the same meaning should
not unnecessarily be applied to both words. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
114. The inclusion of state-law analogues could suggest Congress’s focus
narrowed to the moment of filing, since a class action is never filed under state
procedural rules in federal court. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
But CAFA could not supply jurisdiction for removal if it only applied to cases
filed under the federal law, since cases filed in state court could never apply
the federal rule without CAFA first providing federal jurisdiction. Therefore, it
must apply to cases filed under both state and federal class action rules. Cf.
infra notes 124–29 and accompanying text (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8)
plays a similar role in creating jurisdiction that would not otherwise exist for
cases filed in state court).
115. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 n.9 (2004) (quoting 2A
NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:6, at 194 (6th rev. ed. 2000)).
116. Cf. Hoffman, supra note 112, at 482–83 (comparing conflicting interpretations of “commenced” and finding courts consistently apply the meaning
that more “strictly constru[es] the scope of federal jurisdiction”).
117. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3), (3)( B), (3)(E), (4)(A)(i)(I), (4)(A)(i)(II)(cc),
(4)(A)(i)(III) (2006).
118. See supra note 113 (arguing that this definition is not incorrect, but in
this context that definition should not be applied as it makes use of the word
“commenced” later in the statute unnecessary).
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the same thing as the word “commenced.” Just as courts should
assume Congress does not intend the same meaning for two dif119
ferent words, courts should “give effect, if possible, to every
clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any construction which implies that the legislature was ignorant of the
120
meaning of the language it employed.” If “filed under” already means “originally filed,” adding “originally” in other areas of the statute requires “originally” to have no meaning.
Additional examples found in the structure of CAFA that
weigh against measuring jurisdiction only at the moment of filing include 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(C), which states CAFA’s definition of a class certification order, and 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8),
which states when CAFA’s jurisdictional grant applies. Section
1332(d)(1)(C) defines a class certification order as “approving
the treatment of some or all aspects of a civil action as a class
121
action.” The Seventh Circuit recognized in Cunningham that
“this could mean that in the absence of such an order a suit is
122
not a class action,” and therefore CAFA jurisdiction cannot
continue. But, by first focusing on jurisdiction irrevocably attaching at the moment of filing, that court held that a class cer123
tification order is unnecessary for continued jurisdiction. Only by first assuming jurisdiction is measured solely at the time
of filing, however, does that reasoning hold.
The Seventh Circuit similarly dismissed 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(8), which states that CAFA’s jurisdictional grant
“appl[ies] to any class action before or after the entry of a class
124
Calling this provision irrelevant, the
certification order.”
court guessed that “[p]robably all this means is that the defendant can wait until a class is certified before deciding
125
whether to remove the case to federal court” through CAFA.
Other courts, however, have recognized that this provision

119. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
120. Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883).
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(C).
122. Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc., 592 F.3d 805, 806 (7th
Cir. 2010).
123. Id. (“But remember that jurisdiction attaches when a suit is filed as a
class action, and that invariably precedes certification. All that [the definition]
means is that a suit filed as a class action cannot be maintained as one without an order certifying the class. That needn’t imply that unless the class is
certified the court loses jurisdiction of the case.” (alterations in original)); see
also Metz v. Unizan Bank, 649 F.3d 492, 500 (6th Cir. 2011).
124. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8).
125. Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 806; see also Metz, 649 F.3d at 500.
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means CAFA requires a certification order to provide continu126
ing jurisdiction.
While the Seventh Circuit considered § 1332(d)(8) irrele127
vant to class certification’s role in CAFA jurisdiction, in fact
the provision is necessary for class actions filed directly in federal court. If CAFA only applied after a certification order, it
could never provide jurisdiction from the commencement of the
suit through that order. Instead, it would only provide jurisdiction in the circumstances the Cunningham court described
(when a case commences in state court, is certified by that
court, and then removed by the defendant to federal court). Of
course, under the Seventh Circuit’s approach, only the moment
128
of filing matters for CAFA jurisdiction. But if only the moment of filing matters in determining CAFA jurisdiction, there
is no reason to add that CAFA jurisdiction applies before and
after certification. Again, the Seventh Circuit’s approach to
class certification’s effect on CAFA jurisdiction ignores the
principle that courts should “give effect, if possible, to every
129
clause and word of a statute.”
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, CAFA’s reliance upon Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to define
130
class actions militates against measuring jurisdiction only at
the moment of filing. Rule 23 contemplates its numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and representative adequacy require131
ments as prerequisites to successfully “filing” a class action.
The Supreme Court similarly calls Rule 23’s certification factors “preconditions for maintaining a class action;” indeed, the
126. See, e.g., Ronat v. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Civil No. 05520-GPM, 2008 WL 4963214, at *7 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2008) (“In examining the
statute itself, it is clear to this Court that CAFA does not provide a basis for
subject-matter jurisdiction after a court denies class certification. By its terms,
it ‘shall apply to any class action before or after the entry of a class certification order by the court with respect to that action.’ Under the statute, ‘the
term ‘class certification order’ means an order issued by a court approving the
treatment of some or all aspects of a civil action as a class action.’ This is no
longer a class action and so the case ends here.” (citations omitted)).
127. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
130. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)( B) (2006) (defining a class action as any civil action brought to federal court through Rule 23 or a state-law analogue); id.
§ 1711(2) (same).
131. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) ( listing the class action requirements in a section
entitled “Prerequisites”); see Ronat, 2008 WL 4963214, at *4 (“[ T]he Rule 23(a)
prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy . . . . are
prerequisites to class certification . . . .”).
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Court clearly articulated how Rule 23(a)’s prerequisites impact
class allegations: “[T]he line between eligibility and
132
133
certifiability is entirely artificial.” Certification must occur
and Rule 23 instructs courts and litigants to determine if a putative class action meets Rule 23’s preconditions “[a]t an early
134
practicable time.” Until that time, however, the putative class
action is no more than that—litigants have no right to proceed
as a class if Rule 23’s prerequisites are not met, and if the putative class is not certifiable, it was never eligible for class
treatment. That length of time, from the moment of filing until
certification, explains why 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8) must specify
that CAFA supplies jurisdiction before, as well as after, the certification decision. If not, federal courts would exercise jurisdiction without any congressional authorization. Thus, a putative
class action is not truly a class action until the inextricably intertwined eligibility and certification questions are answered at
certification. Because CAFA relies on that definition and process to determine if its jurisdictional grant applies to a putative
class action, CAFA jurisdiction not fully or properly invoked
until certification.
Taken together, the above-referenced elements of CAFA
lead to the conclusion that jurisdiction should not be measured
solely at the instant of filing, but instead also at class certification, when the court determines the case is, in fact, a class action. Courts like Cunningham, however, preclude that finding
by presuming that the moment of filing is the only instant
135
when jurisdiction must be measured. Similarly, by making
that presumption, these courts preclude the finding that the
structure of CAFA weighs heavily against measuring jurisdiction only at that instant. And as the following Section shows,
these courts’ reasoning also leads to misapplication of precedent requiring that once jurisdiction fully attaches it cannot be
ousted.
B. ST. PAUL MERCURY DOES NOT REQUIRE CAFA JURISDICTION
TO IRREVOCABLY ATTACH AT THE MOMENT OF FILING
In addition to misinterpreting Congress’s use of the phrase
“filed under,” courts that take the Cunningham approach also
132. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct.
1431, 1438 (2010).
133. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
134. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
135. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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misapply the principle that, after jurisdiction properly attach136
es, later changes to jurisdictional facts cannot oust it. That
principle, derived from St. Paul Mercury, appropriately applies
to later events or changes that a litigant may control and po137
tentially abuse. By presuming that jurisdiction is properly
and fully invoked at the moment of filing, though, the Cunningham court failed to question whether changes to the
amount in controversy or place of citizenship are appropriate
comparisons to class certification, which implicates far less risk
138
of manipulation or abuse by litigants. The following examines
that question by comparing and contrasting these jurisdictional
determinations. In this context, class certification—and its effect on CAFA jurisdiction—is not a later event or change falling
within the ambit of St. Paul Mercury, unlike other more com139
mon jurisdictional determinations.
St. Paul Mercury cannot bear the weight that the Seventh
Circuit and other courts have placed on it for a number of reasons. Perhaps most importantly, class certification is not analogous to the events to which St. Paul Mercury traditionally ap140
plies. St. Paul Mercury’s principle applies to the effect of
changes to amounts in controversy for purposes of jurisdiction141
al minimums. In that context, courts may presume that the
amount a plaintiff pleads in good faith establishes jurisdiction,
and “[t]he inability of plaintiff to recover an amount adequate
to give the court jurisdiction does not show his bad faith or oust
142
the jurisdiction.” But federal courts cannot make similar presumptions based on the pleadings in the class action context.
While good-faith pleadings are sufficient to establish the

136. See supra Part I.D.3 (describing how the Cunningham court sought to
vindicate this principle).
137. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab. Co., 303 U.S. 283, 294–95
(1938); cf. In re Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 606 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir.
2010) (noting that “concerns about forum manipulation . . . counsel against”
allowing post-removal events to oust jurisdiction).
138. See infra notes 191–93 and accompanying text.
139. Cf. Marcus, supra note 30 (describing class actions as “constructs” only created when the court approves the class by defining and certifying it).
140. See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, They Can’t Do That, Can They?: Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 858, 887 n.148 (1995) (explaining how,
until 28 U.S.C. § 1367 codified supplemental jurisdiction, St. Paul Mercury
could not apply to class actions as it does to other cases due to the existence of
absent class members).
141. St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. at 294 –95.
142. Id. at 288–89.
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amount in controversy, Rule 23 forbids such presumptions to
143
establish a class.
Even if Rule 23 allowed for good-faith class allegations to
suffice, class certification remains distinct from the jurisdictional facts to which St. Paul Mercury traditionally applies. St.
144
Paul Mercury’s principle applies to amounts in controversy; a
145
similar principle applies to diversity of citizenship. Both principles prevent changes to the facts required for jurisdiction
146
from ousting jurisdiction. For instance, if a plaintiff reduces
the amount claimed or moves to a different state, these changes
147
or events cannot oust properly invoked jurisdiction. Class certification, however, does not amount to a change in jurisdictional facts at all. Rather, class certification requires the court
to examine the facts required for jurisdiction as they stand, and
148
as they stood at pleading. The result of this examination is
not a change or later event as contemplated by St. Paul Mercury; instead, it is simply a required analysis of the sufficiency
149
and adequacy of the pleadings.
St. Paul Mercury itself confirms that when jurisdictional
requirements are insufficient or inadequate from the outset,
the court’s examination to determine the sufficiency of those
requirements can affect jurisdiction; such an examination does
not amount to a change or event that cannot affect jurisdiction.
143. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982) (calling
certification of “actual, not presumed, conformance” to Rule 23’s prerequisites
“indispensable”). In some cases, the pleadings may sufficiently allow a court to
determine the appropriateness of class treatment. Id. But in all cases, even
when making the determination goes to the merits of a claim, federal courts
must certify that a putative class is properly filed under Rule 23. See id. at 161
(reiterating that all class actions must meet Rule 23’s prerequisites, as subject
to a trial court’s “rigorous analysis” through certification).
144. St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. at 294 –95.
145. Id. (citing, inter alia, Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537
(1824)).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See Asociacion Nacional de Pescadores v. Dow Quimica de Colombia,
988 F.2d 559, 565 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Under those circumstances, the court is
still examining the jurisdictional facts as of the time the case is removed, but
the court is considering information submitted after removal.”), abrogated by
Marathon Oil Co. v. A.G. Ruhrgas, 145 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1998), rev’d, 526
U.S. 574 (1999).
149. See id. (distinguishing examination or supplementation of ambiguous
jurisdictional fact from the type of change contemplated by St. Paul Mercury);
cf. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1438 (2010) (rejecting argument that there is a distinction between a putative
class being eligible and being certifiable).
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The Court stated that “[e]vents occurring subsequent to the institution of suit which reduce the amount recoverable below the
statutory limit do not oust jurisdiction,” but qualified that
statement that
if, from the face of the pleadings, it is apparent, to a legal certainty,
that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount claimed or if, from the
proofs, the court is satisfied to a like certainty that the plaintiff never
150
was entitled to recover that amount . . . the suit will be dismissed.

The Court’s qualification makes clear that a facially inadequate basis for jurisdiction is insufficient. A court’s determination of whether a class can be certified is an analogous inquiry
into the adequacy of the pleadings, not a subsequent change in
events that St. Paul Mercury bars from ousting jurisdiction.
For those reasons, courts cannot approach class allegations
in the same way they approach amounts in controversy and
151
places of citizenship. Class certification is not a later event or
change that cannot affect jurisdiction; under Rule 23, and
through CAFA, it is a required jurisdictional determination assessing whether the putative class is in fact entitled to class
152
treatment. As such, CAFA jurisdiction cannot be irrevocably
invoked at the moment of filing.
In sum, to retain jurisdiction after denying class certification, federal courts rely on two erroneous assumptions. First,
the courts interpret CAFA to only require a case to meet the
153
statute’s definition of a class action at the moment of filing.
Second, the courts then misapply the principle that properly
154
invoked jurisdiction cannot be ousted by later events. Both of
these assumptions are necessary to hold that jurisdiction re155
mains after a court denies class certification. Relying on those
assumptions forces courts to misapply CAFA and wrongly
150. St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. at 289–90.
151. Cf. In re Shell Oil Co., 970 F.2d 355, 356 (7th Cir. 1992) ( per curiam)
(requiring jurisdiction be measured “as of the instant of removal” to federal
court). Because a court must certify that a class meets numerosity, commonality, typicality, and representative adequacy requirements to comply with Rule
23, the “instant of removal” is an imprecise, and ultimately unworkable, fiction in this context.
152. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text (distinguishing between
applying St. Paul Mercury in cases when jurisdiction is and is not properly invoked).
153. E.g., Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc., 592 F.3d 805, 807
(7th Cir. 2010).
154. E.g., id.
155. If the case’s status is relevant beyond the moment of filing, the cases
regarding later events would be inapplicable. Similarly, if those cases do not
apply, the timing of the case’s status is irrelevant.
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analogize denial of class certification to changes in citizenship
or the amount in controversy to allow continued jurisdiction. As
the following Part shows, requiring class certification for continued jurisdiction through CAFA better follows CAFA’s plain
language, fits within St. Paul Mercury’s reasoning, and meets
Congress’s goals in enacting CAFA.
III. FEDERAL COURTS CANNOT RETAIN JURISDICTION
THROUGH CAFA AFTER DENYING CLASS
CERTIFICATION
This Note asserts that after denying class certification,
federal courts lose jurisdiction over cases filed as class actions,
making certification a prerequisite for continued CAFA jurisdiction. As described above, the approach that a number of
courts of appeals have begun to adopt misapplies CAFA’s jurisdictional grant and wrongly applies case law holding that once
156
a case is in federal court, jurisdiction cannot be ousted.
A better approach to jurisdiction after a federal court declines to certify a class must address both of those concerns.
Requiring class certification for continued jurisdiction through
CAFA better comports with both Congress’s grant of jurisdic157
tion and existing case law. Further, this approach meets
CAFA’s goals, while mitigating concerns about abuses of class
actions within the confines of Congress’s grant of jurisdiction.
After explaining the mechanics of requiring class certification
for continued CAFA jurisdiction, this Part demonstrates why
this requirement is the correct approach when a court denies
certification.
A. CLASS CERTIFICATION IS A PREREQUISITE FOR CAFA
JURISDICTION
This Note’s thesis is that, when a putative class action is
brought to federal court through CAFA, Rule 23’s requirements
for class treatment—which coincide with CAFA’s prerequisites
158
for jurisdiction—must be certified for continued jurisdiction.
The mechanics of this approach are briefly demonstrated in the
following paragraph and further explored in the following
Sections.

156. See supra Part II.
157. See infra Part III.B–C.
158. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
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If the court determines based on the pleadings that the
class allegations or other CAFA requirements cannot be met to
159
a legal certainty, CAFA cannot provide jurisdiction. Essentially, a frivolous or inadequately pleaded class allegation cannot be sustained under Rule 23 or under CAFA. If the allegations do meet the prerequisites, the court must then consider
certifying the class and enter an order certifying that the pro160
posed class is (or is not) maintainable under Rule 23. CAFA
161
explicitly provides jurisdiction until that order, but if the
court denies certification, CAFA ceases to provide jurisdiction.
If, however, the court certifies the class, CAFA jurisdiction is
fully and properly invoked in the context of St. Paul Mercury
and later changes to the certification order cannot oust it.
B. CLASS CERTIFICATION AS A PREREQUISITE FOR CAFA
JURISDICTION MEETS THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF CAFA AND
PROPERLY FITS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ST. PAUL MERCURY
This Note’s approach—requiring class certification for continued CAFA jurisdiction—effectively conforms to the language
of CAFA and fits within the context of St. Paul Mercury’s holding that jurisdiction, once properly invoked, cannot be ousted
by later events. While Congress could effect the change suggested in the previous subsection by clarifying the language de162
scribing CAFA’s application, the following explains why the
existing statute and precedents support this approach without
163
the need for new or amended legislation.

159. Cf. In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir. 1996) (“A
class is not maintainable as a class action by virtue of its designation as such
in the pleadings.” (citing Cash v. Swifton Land Corp., 434 F.2d 569, 571 (6th
Cir. 1970))).
160. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A) (“At an early practicable time after a person
sues or is sued as a class representative, the court must determine by order
whether to certify the action as a class action.”).
161. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8) (2006) (granting jurisdiction until entry of
the certification order).
162. See supra Part II.A (describing specific instances of conflicting interpretations of language in CAFA).
163. Congress should amend CAFA to effect this interpretation, however, if
other courts of appeals continue the current trend. But as both the interpretation exemplified by Cunningham and the interpretation suggested by this
Note have greater impact on jurisdictional doctrine than actual litigants, there
is little pressure to make such a change.
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1. Class Certification as a Prerequisite for CAFA Jurisdiction
Meets the Plain Language of CAFA
Requiring class certification for continued CAFA jurisdic164
tion reflects the plain language of CAFA. This approach respects CAFA’s definition of a class action (and CAFA’s interaction with Rule 23), as well as the structure of CAFA. Each of
these aspects supports jurisdiction being fully and properly invoked only after class certification.
First, CAFA’s definition of a class action encourages requiring class certification for continued jurisdiction because it
so closely tracks Rule 23’s definition of a class action. CAFA defines a class action as “any civil action filed under rule 23 of the
165
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Rule 23 requires both (1)
that class allegations meet numerosity, commonality, typicali166
ty, and representative adequacy requirements and (2) that a
167
Applied to
court certify that those allegations are met.
CAFA’s definition of a class action, if the certification order is
denied, the case ceases to be filed under Rule 23 and therefore
168
CAFA jurisdiction ceases to apply. Further, this approach co169
incides perfectly with Rule 23’s approach to class actions. Requiring class certification for continued CAFA jurisdiction
makes adequate class allegations a prerequisite for application
170
of CAFA, but recognizes that class certification must occur
171
before jurisdiction is fully and properly invoked.
Second, the structure of CAFA similarly supports requiring
172
class certification to properly invoke CAFA jurisdiction. Since
CAFA requires jurisdiction to exist “before or after the entry of
173
a class certification order,” CAFA provides jurisdiction de164. Though some courts have argued that the language is ambiguous, see,
e.g., Metz v. Unizan Bank, 649 F.3d 492, 500 (6th Cir. 2011); Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07 Civ. 8742(DLC), 2011 WL 196930, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 21, 2011) (“The statute does not speak directly to the issue of whether
class certification is a prerequisite to federal jurisdiction . . . .”), this Note posits that those courts’ interpretation is incorrect.
165. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)( B).
166. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
167. Id. 23(c)(1).
168. See supra note 30 and text accompanying notes 70 & 132.
169. See supra notes 20–38 and accompanying text (explaining the prerequisites to class certification).
170. Otherwise, the action could not be filed under Rule 23 at all.
171. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), (c) (defining class action prerequisites and
certification order procedures).
172. See supra Part II.A.
173. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8) (2006).
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spite the lack of a certification order only before a decision is
174
made on certification. Once a court makes a certification decision, however, CAFA only applies if the court determines the
action is maintainable as a class action.
Using this approach, CAFA’s grant of jurisdiction is not
properly invoked until the class is certified. As the following
Section explains, this approach allows application of St. Paul
Mercury’s holding—jurisdiction, once properly invoked, cannot
175
be ousted by later events —to correctly apply only after a class
certification decision.
2. Class Certification as a Prerequisite for CAFA Jurisdiction
Conforms to St. Paul Mercury
Requiring class certification for continued CAFA jurisdiction fits the context of St. Paul Mercury’s principle that jurisdiction, once properly invoked, cannot be ousted by later
events. While application of St. Paul Mercury at the moment of
176
filing is improper, this Note’s approach creates an appropriate analogy to St. Paul Mercury’s principle. Additionally, since
that principle requires continued jurisdiction “unless the law
177
gives a different rule,” and CAFA does in fact give a different
rule under this approach, St. Paul Mercury requires jurisdiction to end after a court denies class certification. This subsection explains why certification, not filing, is the appropriate
moment for St. Paul Mercury to apply.
One reason is that St. Paul Mercury generally requires
continued jurisdiction if a plaintiff’s good-faith claim for dam178
ages meets the jurisdictional amount, but notes two excep179
tions to that requirement. First, if on the face of the pleadings
“it is apparent, to a legal certainty, that the plaintiff cannot re180
cover the amount claimed,” the suit should be dismissed. The
second exception applies if it becomes apparent “from the
proofs . . . that the plaintiff never was entitled to recover that
181
amount.”
174. Id.
175. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab. Co., 303 U.S. 283, 293 (1938).
176. See supra Part II.B.
177. St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. at 288.
178. Even if the plaintiff is unable to actually recover that amount. Id. at
289–90.
179. Id. at 288–89.
180. Id. at 289.
181. Id.
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These two exceptions match this Note’s approach to CAFA
jurisdiction. For the first exception, CAFA jurisdiction must
cease if the court determines the class allegations are inade182
quate from the face of the pleadings. For the second, CAFA
jurisdiction must cease if, upon analysis for certification, the
court finds the putative class was never entitled to class treat183
ment. In that sense, St. Paul Mercury provides an appropriate analogy when applied at certification, whereas it could not
at the time of filing.
Another reason certification is the proper time to apply St.
Paul Mercury is that the Supreme Court in St. Paul Mercury
held that jurisdiction must continue “unless the law gives a dif184
185
ferent rule.” CAFA does in fact give a different rule. While
CAFA grants federal courts jurisdiction to determine, for any
case adequately pleaded as a class action, if class treatment is
186
appropriate, it also limits its application after a certification
187
decision to cases a court certifies as class actions. By limiting
its jurisdiction after the certification decision, the full invocation of CAFA jurisdiction cannot be determined with certainty
until the moment of certification. Until that point, St. Paul
Mercury cannot apply, as only fully and properly invoked juris188
diction is protected from the effects of later events.
The purpose of St. Paul Mercury’s principle is another reason why certification is the proper time to apply St. Paul Mercury. Requiring class certification does not raise the same forum manipulation concerns that underlay St. Paul Mercury’s
holding. The Court in St. Paul Mercury noted that “[i]f the

182. See Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982) (stating that, in some cases, “the issues are plain enough from the pleadings to determine” prerequisites to class certification).
183. See supra Part III.A.
184. St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. at 288–89.
185. See supra note 177; supra text accompanying notes 125–26 (showing
how CAFA’s limited jurisdiction after certification provides such a “different
rule”).
186. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(8) (2006).
187. See id. ( limiting jurisdiction to “before or after” class certification, implying that failed class certification ousts jurisdiction). Any doubts about
whether CAFA provides jurisdiction after denial of certification weigh against
finding continued jurisdiction. See, e.g., Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[A]ll doubts about jurisdiction should be
resolved in favor of remand to state court.”); Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31
F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994) (“[R]emoval statutes are construed narrowly;
. . . uncertainties are resolved in favor of remand.”).
188. St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. at 294 –95.
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plaintiff could . . . reduce the amount of his demand to defeat
federal jurisdiction the defendant’s supposed statutory right of
189
removal would be subject to the plaintiff’s caprice.” Though
some courts ruling that jurisdiction continues after denying
190
class certification have expressed similar concerns, this approach, and CAFA’s operation, minimize the potential for
plaintiffs to abuse class certification and subject the defendant’s right of removal to their caprice.
There are three ways that CAFA’s operation minimizes
that potential. First, the class certification determination is left
to the court, not the plaintiff. Though certification is often initiated by motion of a party, courts must raise the issue sua
191
sponte when necessary. Second, Rule 23 requires courts to
192
certify the class at an early practicable time. Therefore, concerns about parties waiting until the eve of trial to attempt to
oust jurisdiction are unlikely to be realized. Third, the presumption that courts should approve the class before ruling on
193
dispositive motions minimizes concerns about parties abusing
189. Id. at 294.
190. E.g., Colomar v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., No. 05-22409-CIV, 2007 WL
2083562, at *3 (S.D. Fla. July 20, 2007) (“To litigate the case up to the eve of
trial, and then to seek remand [ by acting to decertify class] after adverse rulings have issued and summary judgment is briefed, equates to a forum shopping which the traditional rules of removal and remand are designed to
preclude.”).
191. See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 20, § 1785 (“[T]he court has an independent obligation to decide whether an action brought on a class basis is to
be so maintained even if neither of the parties moves for a ruling . . . .”); cf.
Edmond v. Goldsmith, 38 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1020 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (“Although
the parties stipulate to the certification, the court has a duty to evaluate independently the proposed class to ensure its compliance with FED. R. CIV. P. 23.”
(citing Retired Chi. Police Ass’n v. City of Chi., 7 F.3d 584, 599 (7th Cir.
1993))), rev’d on other grounds, 183 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1999), aff ’d sub nom.
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
192. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A). Though even an early practicable time may
still be a relatively long time. See Berland v. Mack, 48 F.R.D. 121, 126
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (waiting over two years before ruling on certification).
193. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101–02 (1998)
(holding that federal courts are generally required to satisfy themselves of jurisdiction before ruling on the merits); Edmond, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 1019–20
(“[A] court must resolve [the issue of class certification] before it addresses
dispositive motions.” (citing DeBruyne v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 920
F.2d 457, 463 (7th Cir. 1990))). But cf. Schweizer v. Trans Union Corp., 136
F.3d 233, 239 (2d Cir. 1998) (“‘There is nothing in Rule 23 which precludes the
court from examining the merits of plaintiff ’s claims on a proper Rule 12 motion to dismiss or Rule 56 motion for summary judgment simply because such
a motion’ precedes resolution of the issue of class certification.” (quoting
Lorber v. Beebe, 407 F. Supp. 279, 291 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1976))).
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these procedures after receiving an unfavorable dispositive ruling. Taken together, it is clear that concerns about abuses and
forum manipulation are hypothetical at best.
One final reason that certification, not filing, is the appropriate time for St. Paul Mercury’s principle to apply is the
unique nature of class action procedure. Courts have traditionally treated class actions differently when considering similar
194
issues. The realities of class action litigation require more in195
depth procedural and, in CAFA’s case, jurisdictional inquiries
196
than for other forms of actions. CAFA further complicates
otherwise simple jurisdictional determinations, such as
amounts in controversy and places of citizenship, and forces
courts to make at-times lengthy and in-depth determinations.
For example, at times courts must make exceedingly detailed
examinations of places of residence for class members to de197
termine if CAFA jurisdiction is appropriate. Courts have also
required similarly detailed examinations into individual claims
198
and individual class members to determine jurisdiction. The199
se types of “preliminary jurisdictional determination[s]” are
200
inherent in determining CAFA jurisdiction. “[G]iven the criti194. See Marcus, supra note 140 (explaining how, until 28 U.S.C. § 1367
codified supplemental jurisdiction, St. Paul Mercury could not apply to class
actions as it does to other cases due to the existence of absent class members).
195. See Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Burdens of Jurisdictional Proof, 59
ALA. L. REV. 409, 414 –19 (2008) (describing the unique application of jurisdictional burdens of proof for CAFA).
196. See Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., 527 U.S. 198, 205 (1999) (stating
that class certification determination is “enmeshed in the legal and factual aspects of the case” (citing Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469
(1978))).
197. See Marcus, supra note 30, at 1787 (“‘Despite the logistical challenges
of offering reliable evidence at this preliminary jurisdictional stage, CAFA
does not permit the courts to make a citizenship determination on a record
bare of any evidence showing class members’ [ place of citizenship].’” (quoting
Preston v. Tenet Healthsystem Mem’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 F.3d 793, 802 (5th
Cir. 2007))).
198. Before CAFA’s $5 million total amount-in-controversy requirement
(and the Supreme Court’s decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005)), courts were forced to make inquiries into
whether each class member exceeded the $75,000 minimum for diversity jurisdiction found in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). See Allapattah, 545 U.S. at 554 –55
(describing a prior decision in which the Court mandated that “every plaintiff
must separately satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement”).
199. Preston, 485 F.3d at 812.
200. See Marcus, supra note 30, at 1787 (“That determination could require
a court either to gather considerable information about those class members’
claims or indulge in assumptions that might seem unwarranted given the critical importance of jurisdiction.”).
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cal importance of jurisdiction,” courts cannot “indulge in as201
sumptions” in examining these jurisdictional issues—courts
must engage in more rigorous analysis of jurisdictional
questions.
In the certification context, the need for more rigorous
analysis becomes even more important. Recent Supreme Court
decisions relating to class certification highlight that importance. The opinion in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates,
PA. v. Allstate Inssurance Co. made clear that there is no dis202
tinction between certifiability and eligibility under Rule 23.
Therefore, a court must certify, to satisfy both Rule 23’s and
CAFA’s requirements, that those prerequisites are, or ever
were, met. Simply alleging that those prerequisites are met is
203
inadequate, and therefore not alone sufficient to fully invoke
jurisdiction, so courts can and often must “delve beyond the
pleadings to determine whether the requirements for class cer204
tification are satisfied.” In sum, class action procedure is exceedingly complicated. Requiring courts to apply St. Paul Mercury before making these difficult factual inquiries
misunderstands the unique nature of class action procedure, in
which courts may only discover that the pleadings are insufficient to maintain a class after a rigorous factual determination.
The better approach is the one that this Note advocates: class
certification is required for continued CAFA jurisdiction.
On the whole, requiring class certification for continued
CAFA jurisdiction is more sound than allowing continued jurisdiction if certification is denied. Requiring certification better conforms with the plain language of CAFA and better suits
St. Paul Mercury’s principle that jurisdiction properly invoked

201. Id.; see also supra Part I (describing the relationship between the limits on federal jurisdiction, CAFA’s grant of that jurisdiction, and Rule 23’s operation on class actions).
202. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct.
1431, 1438 (2010) (stating that eligibility and certifiability are both “preconditions” for class treatment under the federal rule and rejecting the argument
that the two are distinct issues); see also Marcus, supra note 30, at 1778 (describing class actions as “constructs approved (indeed, created) by the court’s
certification order”).
203. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 316 (3d
Cir. 2008) (stating that prerequisites for Rule 23 are “not mere pleading
rules,” and courts must investigate adequacy of class allegations (citing Szabo
v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675–77 (7th Cir. 2001))).
204. Id. (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
259 F.3d 154, 167 (3d Cir. 2001)).
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cannot be ousted by later events. As the following Section
shows, it also better meets Congress’s goals in enacting CAFA.
C. CLASS CERTIFICATION AS A PREREQUISITE FOR CAFA
JURISDICTION BETTER MEETS CONGRESS’S GOALS IN ENACTING
CAFA
Congress enacted CAFA to allow federal courts to hear in205
terstate cases of national importance and intended for CAFA
to allow federal procedure for class actions to apply to these in206
terstate cases. This Note’s approach to jurisdiction following
denial of class certification advances that goal.
At first glance, this approach’s requirement that federal
courts remand or dismiss cases after denying class certification
may appear contrary to Congress’s stated goal of bringing more
207
class actions into federal courts; in fact, the court in Cunningham characterized its holding as bolstered by that same
208
goal. But, as explained below, this Note’s approach does more
to allow for federal jurisdiction over these class actions than
the approach favored by the Cunningham court.
This Note’s approach creates a number of incentives encouraging litigation of class actions in federal court. As characterized by Cunningham, CAFA’s purpose is to relax jurisdictional standards to allow for more class actions to more easily
209
be litigated in federal court. Applying class certification as a
prerequisite for CAFA jurisdiction effects this goal in a number
of ways.
First, this approach may lead to federal courts relaxing the
baseline class certification standard to more closely align with

205. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2( b)(2), 119
Stat. 4, 5 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
206. Marcus, supra note 30, at 1788–89.
207. As federal courts generally more stringently construe certification requirements, it is possible that a federal court may deny certification, remand
the case to state court, and have the state court subsequently certify that
same class. Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2376–78 (2011); see Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc., 592 F.3d 805, 807 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that if “a state happened to have different criteria for certifying a class”
than the federal standard, “the result of a remand because of the federal
court’s refusal to certify the class could be that the case would continue as a
class action in state court”).
208. Cunningham, 592 F.3d at 807 (characterizing CAFA’s purpose as “relaxing the requirement of complete diversity of citizenship so that class actions involving incomplete diversity can be litigated in federal court”).
209. Id.
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210

state practices. This is not to say that federal procedure must
deteriorate to meet the “drive-by” certification standards that
211
led to CAFA’s passage. Relaxing the baseline for meeting, for
example, Rule 23’s commonality and typicality requirements,
does not affect the increasingly rigorous factual analyses that
212
still must apply. Instead, this means that federal courts must
balance Congress’s intent to increase the availability of federal
213
procedure for class actions otherwise filed in state courts with
214
current standards for applying Rule 23’s prerequisites.
Further, this approach effectively balances the availability
of both state and federal fora with Congress’s jurisdictional
grant in CAFA. Through CAFA, Congress could have, but did
215
not, essentially federalize class actions. Instead, Congress expanded diversity jurisdiction to allow federal courts to hear “in216
terstate cases of national importance” and carved out excep210. See Marcus, supra note 30, at 1769 (explaining that CAFA may “empower future federal courts to become more creative in favor of class action
treatment,” in ways such as adopting class certification rules similar to those
of state courts).
211. See Marcus, Erie, CAFA, and Federalism, supra note 53, at 1294 (explaining a pre-CAFA practice in Alabama, much maligned by certain CAFA
supporters, by which plaintiffs “would file a motion for class certification with
the complaint and get a decision before the defendant had a chance to file a
responsive pleading”).
212. See Steven R. Peterson & Andrew Y. Lemon, Rigorous Analysis to
Bridge the Inference Gap in Class Certification, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
93, 94 (2011) (“In the past, plaintiffs could satisfy Rule 23 by making a
‘threshold showing’ that they would be able to meet the requirements of Rule
23 at trial. Recently, there has been a movement across the federal appellate
courts to require increased proof that the requirements of Rule 23 are met prior to a district court’s decision to certify a class. Although there is no unanimity yet among the federal appellate courts, the Third Circuit’s decision in In re
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation is emblematic of these new standards
that require plaintiffs to present a more rigorous analysis demonstrating that
Rule 23 is satisfied. Specifically, the court now requires that district courts
make factual determinations that Rule 23 is satisfied, which, by necessity, requires resolving all legal disputes relevant to class certification and consideration of all relevant evidence, including expert testimony, even if there is overlap with merits issues.”).
213. In this context, the application of Rule 23 and precedent requiring
more than cursory analysis of the adequacy of class allegations.
214. Here, the dividing line between what constitutes sufficient or insufficient facts to meet Rule 23’s requirements.
215. See Marcus, supra note 30, at 1809–13 (discussing use of jurisdiction
to achieve substantive objectives, examining two statutes that do just that,
and concluding that “Congress went to some pains not to undertake any such
delegation of lawmaking power in CAFA” (emphasis added)).
216. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(b)(2), 119
Stat. 4, 5 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2006)).
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tions to prevent CAFA from reaching all class actions. This
approach ensures that state courts remain available for cases
outside the ambit of CAFA, and ensures that CAFA does not
impermissibly work to impose federal class action procedure on
218
state courts. Even without indirectly furthering Congress’s
purposes in enacting CAFA, the principle that federal courts
are courts of limited jurisdiction mandates limiting CAFA to
219
the jurisdictional grant found in the statute’s text.
Additionally, this approach may lead to the focus of this
type of litigation shifting towards the merits and away from the
certification decision. While the approach exemplified in Cunningham incentivizes continued challenges to certification, this
Note’s approach reduces the incentive to continue challenging
certification throughout litigation. Under the Cunningham approach, defendants can and should challenge certification
220
winning the certification fight frethroughout litigation;
221
quently ends the litigation. Under this Note’s approach, cases
move closer to resolution on the merits without undue prejudice
to either party beyond the incentives underlying class actions
222
as a procedural device.
In comparison to the above incentives created by adopting
this Note’s approach, the approach advocated by the Cunning217. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4).
218. Normatively, state courts should remain available for state law
claims, which CAFA inherently affects, if states legislate with state court procedure as a backdrop, and especially for consumer law claims, where the
state’s interest rests in protecting its residents.
219. See Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 212 (1971) (“The power reserved to the states, under the Constitution, to provide for the determination of controversies in their courts, may be restricted only by the action of
Congress in conformity to the judiciary sections of the Constitution . . . . Due
regard for the rightful independence of state governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which (a federal) statute has defined.” (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S.
263, 270 (1934))).
220. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C) (“An order that grants or denies class certification may be altered or amended before final judgment.”).
221. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 20 and accompanying text; see also Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“The policy at the very core of the
class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do
not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting
his or her rights.” (quotations and citations omitted)). For a critique of those
incentives, see Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130
S. Ct. 1431, 1465 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“A court’s decision to certify
a class . . . places pressure on the defendant to settle” regardless of the merits.).
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ham court does little to advance CAFA’s purpose of providing a
federal forum for class actions—when a federal court denies
class certification, the case can no longer be considered a class
223
action. Federal courts do little to advance CAFA’s stated goal
of bringing more class actions to federal court by retaining ju224
risdiction over a single plaintiff’s claim.
Overall, this Note’s approach can lead to both a greater
number of class actions in federal courts and a greater percentage in federal courts (in relation to state courts). While the
Cunningham court sought to bolster its approach using this
same reasoning, in practice that approach may well be less effective in meeting CAFA’s purpose. Similarly, when courts rely
on St. Paul Mercury to hold that certification does not impact
CAFA jurisdiction, those courts effectively eviscerate the purpose of St. Paul Mercury’s principle: rather than discouraging
litigant manipulation and abuse, those courts make certification an even more powerful tool for defendants to avoid litigation on the merits.
CONCLUSION
In cases filed as class actions but denied class certification,
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 cannot provide subjectmatter jurisdiction for federal courts. Continued jurisdiction after denial of class certification violates the principle that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, is contrary to the
plain language of the statute, and exceeds Congress’s grant of
jurisdiction. By remanding these cases to state courts, federal
courts correctly interpret St. Paul Mercury’s principle that jurisdiction once properly invoked cannot be ousted by later
events, since class certification is required to properly invoke
CAFA jurisdiction. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 is a
tool to allow federal courts jurisdiction over many class actions,
but it cannot provide jurisdiction for those cases that a court
determines are not class actions.

223. See supra note 14.
224. Richardson, supra note 5, at 125.

